Sealed-bid Auctions

Sealed-Bid Auctions is a type of auction mechanism in which each bidder submits a single bid without knowledge of the bids submitted by others, and the winner is determined according to a predefined rule based on the submitted bids.

678

Publications

60.9K

Citations

1.2K

Authors

542

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

95

Authors

1.2K

  1. HJ
    Harry J. Paarsch

    University of Iowa, United States

    9 publications · 466 citations

    9

    h-index

  2. MH
    Michael H. Rothkopf

    Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, United States

    8 publications · 679 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. QV
    Quang Vuong

    University of Southern California, United States

    7 publications · 1.3K citations

    7

    h-index

  4. JG
    John G. Riley

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    7 publications · 869 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. EK
    Elena Katok

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    7 publications · 508 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 1.2K

Venues

  1. Games and Economic Behavior

    35 publications · 2.3K citations

    24

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 26 publications · 2.3K citations

    22

    h-index

  3. Economics Letters

    27 publications · 960 citations

    17

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 31 publications · 789 citations

    16

    h-index

  5. American Economic Review

    14 publications · 2.6K citations

    14

    h-index

1–5