Repeat-player Effects

Repeat-Player Effects is a phenomenon in dispute resolution whereby a party that frequently participates in arbitration proceedings gains a systemic advantage over one-time adversaries due to accumulated procedural knowledge, established relationships with arbitral institutions, and strategic experience in selecting forums and adjudicators.

7

Publications

323

Citations

12

Authors

7

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

12

  1. JW
    Joel Waldfogel

    University of Minnesota, United States

    1 publications · 43 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. CM
    Carrie Menkel‐Meadow

    Georgetown University, United States

    1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. RR
    Randi Ryterman

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    1 publications · 33 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. JA
    Joseph A. Conti

    University of California, Santa Barbara, United States

    1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. SM
    Stewart Macaulay

    University of Wisconsin–Madison, United States

    1 publications · 39 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 12

Venues

  1. Law & Society Review

    3 publications · 188 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. eCommons (Cornell University)

    Repository · 1 publications · 30 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. The Journal of Legal Studies

    JLS · 1 publications · 43 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Law & Social Inquiry

    1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. The Knowledge Bank (The Ohio State University)

    Repository · 1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5