Regulatory Capture

Regulatory Capture is a form of regulatory failure in which a public regulatory agency established to serve the public interest becomes systematically dominated by, and acts to advance the commercial or political interests of, the industry or narrow constituency it is charged with regulating rather than those of the broader public.

455

Publications

24.3K

Citations

739

Authors

433

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

108

Authors

739

  1. KW
    Kenneth W. Abbott

    Arizona State University, United States

    4 publications · 427 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. JB
    John Braithwaite

    Australian National University, Australia

    4 publications · 528 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. JS
    Joel S. Hellman

    World Bank, United States

    3 publications · 370 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. DS
    Duncan Snidal

    University of Chicago, United States

    3 publications · 364 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. OM
    Oliver M. Rui

    China Europe International Business School, China

    3 publications · 287 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 739

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 35 publications · 1K citations

    19

    h-index

  2. eYLS (Yale Law School)

    Repository · 14 publications · 332 citations

    12

    h-index

  3. Regulation & Governance

    11 publications · 572 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. Telecommunications Policy

    8 publications · 172 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. Journal of Marketing

    JM · 6 publications · 228 citations

    6

    h-index

1–5