Judicial Capture

Judicial Capture is a form of regulatory capture in which a court or judicial system, as a decision-making body, becomes aligned with the interests of a particular group—typically powerful economic actors—through mechanisms such as ideological influence, institutional pressure, or strategic appointment, thereby distorting legal interpretation and adjudication to favor that group over the public interest.

11

Publications

306

Citations

17

Authors

12

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

17

  1. PW
    Paul W. MacAvoy

    Yale University, United States

    1 publications · 13 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. NP
    Nikolaj Petersen

    Aarhus University, Denmark

    1 publications · 19 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. RC
    Richard C. Donnelly

    Yale University, United States

    1 publications · 15 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. TW
    Thomas W. Merrill

    Columbia University, United States

    1 publications · 34 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. GE
    Gerald E. Frug

    1 publications · 37 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 17

Venues

  1. Journal of Theoretical Politics

    JTP · 1 publications · 33 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. Yale journal on regulation

    1 publications · 13 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. University of Pennsylvania Law Review

    1 publications · 37 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Chicago-Kent law review

    1 publications · 34 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. International Review of Law and Economics

    1 publications · 29 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5