One-Sided Matching is a type of matching mechanism in which agents from a single set are assigned to a collection of roles, objects, or positions based on their preferences and the constraints of the allocation environment, without reciprocal preferences from the matched entities.
34
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2017–2026
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Publications
34
On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems
Lin Zhou · Journal of Economic Theory · 1990 · 244 citations
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite et al. · Econometrica · 2014 · 129 citations · Full text
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Authors
65
- MB
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1–5 of 65
Institutions
46
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
156 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
305 citations
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
40 citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
3 h-index
6 publications
116 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
359 citations
University of Lausanne
Lausanne, Switzerland
2 h-index
2 publications
23 citations
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, United States
2 h-index
5 publications
191 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
147 citations
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Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 6 publications · 83 citations
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- American Economic Journal Microeconomics
3 publications · 161 citations
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- IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
2 publications · 114 citations
2
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- Econometrica
2 publications · 199 citations
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- Games and Economic Behavior
2 publications · 36 citations
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