Lock-up Options

Lock-Up Options is a strategic takeover defense mechanism in corporate finance that grants a potential acquirer preferential rights to purchase significant assets or equity stakes at a predetermined price, thereby deterring competing bidders by increasing the cost or complexity of an alternative acquisition.

9

Publications

870

Citations

16

Authors

15

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

16

  1. LK
    Laurie Krigman

    Babson College, United States

    2 publications · 551 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. RK
    Rajesh K. Aggarwal

    Universidad del Noreste, Mexico

    2 publications · 551 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. KL
    Kent L. Womack

    University of Toronto, Canada

    2 publications · 551 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. TR
    Timothy R. Burch

    University of Miami, United States

    2 publications · 146 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RA
    Ruzita Abdul‐Rahim

    National University of Malaysia, Malaysia

    1 publications · 66 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 16

Venues

  1. Journal of Financial Economics

    2 publications · 564 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 1 publications · 118 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. 1

    h-index

  4. International Review of Economics & Finance

    1 publications · 58 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. European Economic Review

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5