Leniency Policy Design

Leniency Policy Design is a institutional mechanism in antitrust enforcement that distinguishes itself by structuring incentives for cartel members to self-report and cooperate with authorities in exchange for reduced penalties, thereby facilitating detection and prosecution of collusive agreements.

70

Publications

3.4K

Citations

81

Authors

73

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Authors

81

  1. GS
    Giancarlo Spagnolo

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    16 publications · 802 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. PB
    Paolo Buccirossi

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    6 publications · 216 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. JZ
    Jun Zhou

    Bar-Ilan University, Israel

    4 publications · 61 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. SF
    Sven‐Olof Fridolfsson

    Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden

    3 publications · 122 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. WP
    Wouter P. J. Wils

    European Commission, Belgium

    3 publications · 73 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 81

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 17 publications · 750 citations

    14

    h-index

  2. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 6 publications · 164 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. 6

    h-index

  4. World Competition

    4 publications · 75 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Econstor (Econstor)

    Repository · 3 publications · 225 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5