Deterrence Tradeoffs

Deterrence Tradeoffs is a theoretical construct in antitrust economics that identifies the tension between incentivizing private parties to self-report violations through leniency policies and preserving the threat of sanctions necessary to deter future anticompetitive behavior.

48

Publications

3K

Citations

79

Authors

59

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

79

  1. GS
    Giancarlo Spagnolo

    Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden

    5 publications · 499 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. ÉL
    Éric Langlais

    EconomiX, France

    2 publications · 65 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. CR
    Cass R. Sunstein

    Harvard University, United States

    2 publications · 314 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. DS
    David Schkade

    The University of Texas at Austin, United States

    2 publications · 314 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. DK
    Daniel Kahneman

    Princeton University, United States

    2 publications · 314 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 79

Venues

  1. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 4 publications · 114 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 4 publications · 500 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. American Economic Journal Microeconomics

    3 publications · 103 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. International Review of Law and Economics

    3 publications · 237 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. The Journal of Legal Studies

    JLS · 2 publications · 169 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5