Conditional Leniency

Conditional Leniency is a leniency mechanism in antitrust enforcement policy that grants immunity or reduced sanctions to colluding firms on the condition of fulfilling specific requirements, such as being the first to report the cartel or providing decisive evidence for prosecution.

10

Publications

230

Citations

18

Authors

18

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

18

  1. CO
    Corbett

    1 publications · 33 citations

    1

    h-index

  2. MH
    Marco Haan

    University of Groningen, Netherlands

    1 publications · 29 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. PC
    Pamela C. Ronald

    University of California, Davis, United States

    1 publications · 33 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. SS
    Silvio Sticher

    Swiss Federal Railways, Switzerland

    1 publications · 16 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. YG
    Yoav Ganzach

    Tel Aviv University, Israel

    1 publications · 39 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 18

Venues

  1. Review of Industrial Organization

    RIO · 2 publications · 45 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Minnesota law review

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 1 publications · 15 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. De Economist

    1 publications · 40 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. World Competition

    1 publications · 13 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5