Interdependent Security Games

Interdependent Security Games is a game-theoretic framework in which the security outcomes of participating agents are mutually dependent, as each agent’s optimal security investment decision is influenced by the vulnerabilities and actions of others within an interconnected network.

64

Publications

2.4K

Citations

156

Authors

78

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

21

Authors

156

  1. LE
    Luis E. Ortiz

    Stony Brook University, United States

    4 publications · 123 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. JG
    Jens Großklags

    Technical University of Munich, Germany

    4 publications · 104 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. GS
    Galina Schwartz

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    3 publications · 226 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. GH
    Geoffrey Heal

    Columbia University, United States

    3 publications · 193 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. HK
    Howard Kunreuther

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    3 publications · 166 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 156

Venues

  1. 3

    h-index

  2. The Engineering Economist

    2 publications · 142 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Risk Analysis

    2 publications · 139 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of the Operational Research Society

    OR · 2 publications · 69 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 66 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5