Incumbent Entry Deterrence

Incumbent Entry Deterrence is a strategic behavior employed by an established firm in a market, classified as a competitive tactic within industrial organization economics, that specifically involves preemptive actions designed to discourage new entrants from competing by altering the economic conditions of entry.

210

Publications

15.1K

Citations

313

Authors

212

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

16

Authors

313

  1. PM
    Peter M. Kort

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    5 publications · 106 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. JA
    J. Anthony Cookson

    University of Colorado Boulder, United States

    4 publications · 178 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. MS
    Marius Schwartz

    Georgetown University, United States

    3 publications · 142 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. MD
    Mathias Dewatripont

    Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

    3 publications · 230 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. CS
    Chad Syverson

    University of Chicago, United States

    3 publications · 533 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 313

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 16 publications · 517 citations

    15

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    14 publications · 997 citations

    14

    h-index

  3. International Journal of Industrial Organization

    13 publications · 614 citations

    12

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    6 publications · 1.1K citations

    6

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 6 publications · 239 citations

    6

    h-index

1–5