Incomplete Information Bargaining

Incomplete Information Bargaining is a theoretical framework in game theory that models bargaining interactions where one or more parties lack full knowledge of the others' preferences, payoffs, or types, distinguishing it from complete information models by incorporating strategic uncertainty and private information into the negotiation process.

329

Publications

26.8K

Citations

499

Authors

308

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

27

Variants

Bargaining Under Incomplete Information

Authors

499

  1. PP
    Paul Pecorino

    University of Alabama, United States

    8 publications · 252 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. KC
    Kalyan Chatterjee

    Pennsylvania State University, United States

    6 publications · 964 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. NR
    Nicholas R. Jennings

    University of Southampton, United Kingdom

    6 publications · 487 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. CM
    Catholijn M. Jonker

    Delft University of Technology, Netherlands

    5 publications · 433 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. AR
    Amnon Rapoport

    University of Arizona, United States

    5 publications · 172 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5 of 499

Venues

  1. The Review of Economic Studies

    16 publications · 2.5K citations

    16

    h-index

  2. Econometrica

    15 publications · 3.2K citations

    15

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 17 publications · 1.1K citations

    15

    h-index

  4. Games and Economic Behavior

    15 publications · 2.2K citations

    15

    h-index

  5. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 17 publications · 335 citations

    12

    h-index

1–5