Epistemic Wrongness

Epistemic Wrongness is a normative epistemic property denoting the failure to meet epistemic obligations or standards in belief formation, justification, or inquiry, whereby a cognitive act or state is subject to epistemic evaluation as impermissible, irrational, or epistemically blameworthy.

36

Publications

1.8K

Citations

52

Authors

38

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

16

Authors

52

  1. KA
    Keith A. Hutchison

    Montana State University, United States

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. HC
    Havi Carel

    University of Bristol, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 86 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. JD
    Jeffrey D. Johnson

    University of Missouri, United States

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. JH
    James H. Neely

    University at Albany, State University of New York, United States

    2 publications · 88 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. RW
    Ryan West

    University of Florida, United States

    1 publications · 51 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 52

Venues

  1. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement

    3 publications · 191 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. 2

    h-index

  3. Philosophical Studies

    2 publications · 36 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Australasian Journal of Philosophy

    1 publications · 18 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice

    1 publications · 25 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5