Content-dependent Reasons
Content-Dependent Reasons is a normative justification in legal obligation that belongs to the genus of practical reasons and is distinguished by its reliance on the intrinsic moral or ethical significance of the action's content rather than on institutional sources or procedural legitimacy alone.
14
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450
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25
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16
Institutions
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2017–2026
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Law and Content-Independent Reasons
P. Markwick · Oxford Journal of Legal Studies · 2000 · 32 citations
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Technische Universität Berlin
Berlin, Germany
2 h-index
4 publications
88 citations
Deutsche Telekom (Germany)
Bonn, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
44 citations
Kingston University
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
4 publications
88 citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations

University of York
York, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
74 citations
Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
Goethe University Frankfurt
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
1 h-index
1 publications
21 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
29 citations
1–8 of 16
NRJ · 1 publications · 17 citations
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1 publications · 105 citations
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1 publications · 74 citations
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Repository · 1 publications · 11 citations
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1 publications · 13 citations
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