Certification Signaling

Certification Signaling is a competitive signaling mechanism in which an agent conveys credible information about its unobservable qualities by obtaining a verifiable endorsement from a trusted third party, thereby differentiating itself from non-certified counterparts in a strategic environment.

23

Publications

1.3K

Citations

41

Authors

34

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Authors

41

  1. LH
    Louis H. Ederington

    University of Oklahoma, United States

    2 publications · 74 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. MD
    Michaël Dewally

    Towson University, United States

    2 publications · 74 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. SS
    Steven Schilizzi

    The University of Western Australia, Australia

    2 publications · 104 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. KS
    Konrad Stahl

    University of Mannheim, Germany

    2 publications · 50 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. EA
    Emmanuelle Auriol

    Toulouse School of Economics, France

    2 publications · 104 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 41

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 74 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 2 publications · 29 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 1 publications · 10 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management

    1 publications · 27 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Public Economic Theory

    1 publications · 33 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5