DoS and Stealthy Deception Attacks for Switched Systems: A Cooperative Approach

Abstract

This paper studies the security problem for switched systems when the sensor-to-controller and controller-to-actuator channels are compromised by cooperative attacks. The attack is expected to be as stealthy as possible, regardless of whether system mode is eavesdropped or not. The conditions that the attack sequence needs to meet are given, along with the stealthy guarantee when the attacker has access to system mode information. It is shown that whenever the mode is unknown, the corresponding attack sequence is detectable since the residual becomes much larger than the threshold of the detector. For the mode-dependent attack case, a mode identification method is proposed. Then a cooperative attack strategy consisting of DoS attack and deception attack is developed, which retains the advantages of hiding deception attack and making system divergent. Finally, the effectiveness of the cooperative attack strategy is evaluated through simulations.