IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems · 2018 · 35 citations · 5 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityCryptographyHardware SecurityHardware Security VerificationMicroarchitectural SecuritySide-channel AnalysisSide-channel AttacksTiming AnalysisCompressionS-box DesignShare CompressionSide-channel Attack ResistanceSide-channel ResistanceSide-channel Resistance VerificationSide-channel Resistant Design
In this work, we introduce a generalized concept for low-latency masking that is applicable to any implementation and protection order, and (in its most extreme form) does not require on-the-fly randomness. The main idea of our approach is to avoid collisions of shared variables in nonlinear circuit parts and to skip the share compression. We show the feasibility of our approach on a full implementation of a one-round unrolled Ascon variant and on an AES S-box case study. Additionally, we discuss possible trade-offs to make our approach interesting for practical implementations. As a result, we obtain a first-order masked AES S-box that is calculated in a single clock cycle with rather high implementation costs (60.7 kGE), and a two-cycle variant with much less implementation costs (6.7 kGE). The side-channel resistance of our Ascon S-box designs up to order three are then verified using the formal analysis tool of [BGI+18]. Furthermore, we introduce a taint checking based verification approach that works specifically for our low-latency approach and allows us to verify large circuits like our low-latency AES S-box design in reasonable time.
5
Stefan Mangard · Journal of Cryptographic Engineering · 2018 · 42 citations · Full text
Rhythmic Keccak: SCA Security and Low Latency in HW
Víctor Arribas, Begül Bilgin, George Petrides et al. · VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) · 2018 · 24 citations · Full text