The Journal of Philosophy · 2011 · 14 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesEconomicsEvolutionary BiologyEvolutionary PsychologyEvolutionary TheoryGame TheoryBehavioral EvolutionEvolution Of CooperationEvolutionary DynamicsEvolutionary Game TheoryMoral NormsNash EquilibriumCooperation In Social DilemmasEvolution Of Social BehaviorGame-theoretic EvolutionLearning In GamesMoral Behavior EvolutionMoral LearningSocial Agents
The idea that the origin of moral norms can be explained in Darwinian terms has been with us since Darwin himself.But recently it has taken a more promising form with the advent of evolutionary game theory.Combining concepts and formal tools from evolutionary biology and economics, current evolutionary game theoretic models embody a distinct picture of the origin of morality.On this picture morality is the product of cultural evolution.That is, the evolution of norms happens within culture as the aggregate product of individual-level behavioral learning.The circumstances in which moral norms come into play are represented as strategic interactions such as bargaining and cooperation/defection scenarios.A basic assumption is that social agents generally seek to improve their lot in such interactions and that they do so by learning from peers.Strategies that have secured higher payoff will tend to spread, because social learners will