Theory of Social Proof and Legal Compliance: A Socio-Cognitive Explanation for Regulatory (Non) Compliance

Shubhangi Roy

German Law Journal · 2021 · 22 citations · 2 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

The article challenges the assumption of perfect legal knowledge and applies social psychology to explain how individuals decide on legal compliance under imperfect information. It adapts the social influence conception of criminal deterrence to regulatory compliance, aiming to clarify how social influence motivates compliance, shapes the expressive functions of law, and informs policy to enhance voluntary and sanctioned adherence. The authors define social influence as more than visible deterrence, identifying who, how many, and what behaviors constitute adequate social proof, and embed this interaction in a dynamic framework that links specific rules, system‑wide compliance cascades, and evolving perceptions guiding expectations for new laws. The model shows that over time societies converge to high or low compliance equilibria.

Abstract

Abstract Challenging the assumption of perfect legal knowledge, this Article employs social psychology to better understand how individuals make decisions about legal compliance under imperfect information conditions. It adapts the informational aspects of “social influence conception of criminal deterrence” to regulatory compliance at large. However, it conceptualizes social influence as more than just “visible deterrence.” Social Psychology helps us to understand who, how many, and what kind of behaviors constitute adequate social proof to guide an individual’s decision on compliance. Additionally, the interaction of social proof and legal compliance is considered within a dynamic framework in relation to specific rules and across the system. Within this framework, compliance/non-compliance cascades across different rules and can create a perception about legal compliance at large, which in turn guides initial expectations with respect to new laws. Over time, this can create high/low compliance equilibriums within which societies operate. Understanding this informational role that social influence plays in legal compliance can further our understanding of what motivates compliance, the potency of the expressive functions of law in societies operating within different compliance equilibriums, and inform policy discussions on how to improve compliance—both voluntary and through sanction/incentives.

References

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