Management Science · 2017 · 100 citations · 5 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsCompetitive AdvantageDecision TheoryGame TheoryGame Theory In CompetitionIndividual IncentivesInnovation CompetitionOpen InnovationCompetition-based IncentivesCompetitionsContest CompetitionEffort InvestmentEffort Provision In TournamentsInnovation ContestsWinner-take-all DynamicsWinner-take-all Incentives
In a contest in which solvers with heterogeneous expertise exert effort to develop solutions, a recent paper [Terwiesch C, Xu Y (2008) Innovation contests, open innovation, and multiagent problem solving. Management Sci. 54(9):1529–1543] argues that as more solvers enter the contest, every solver will reduce effort due to a lower probability of winning the contest. This paper corrects mistakes in this theory, and shows that there exist high-expertise solvers who may raise their effort in response to increased competition. This is because more entrants raise the expected best performance among other solvers, creating positive incentives for solvers to exert higher effort to win the contest. Because of this positive effect, we find that a free-entry open contest is more likely to be optimal to a contest organizer than what Terwiesch and Xu (2008) and other prior literature asserted. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2738 . This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.
5
Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem Solving
Christian Terwiesch, Yi Xu · Management Science · 2008 · 928 citations · Full text
Auctionin Entry into Tournaments
Richard L. Fullerton, R. Preston McAfee · Journal of Political Economy · 1999 · 475 citations
Business, Economics, Auction Theory +11
Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela · Journal of Economic Theory · 2005 · 303 citations · Full text
Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
Laurence Ales, Soo-Haeng Cho, Ersin Körpeoğlu · Operations Research · 2017 · 135 citations