American Economic Review · 2014 · 313 citations · 43 references
Public AffairsEconomicsRegulatory PolicyContract TheoryEnvironmental EconomicsRegulatory EconomicsCarbon MarketsCarbon RegulationEmissions TradingEnvironmental CompensationRelocation PolicyRisk AllocationCarbon Emissions TradingEmissions Allowance AllocationEmissions Allowance MarketsEmissions Allowance TradingRelocationRelocation AllowancesTradable Emission PermitsTradeable Emission Permits
When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent relocation, efficient payment distribution must equalize marginal relocation probabilities weighted by relocation damage. The study formalizes the economic logic of compensation distribution and applies it to EU ETS compensation rules for carbon‑intensive, trade‑exposed industries. The authors model how free permit allocation to these industries shapes relocation incentives under the EU ETS. The analysis shows that current compensation practices result in substantial overcompensation for carbon leakage risk, while efficient permit allocation can reduce aggregate job‑loss risk by more than half without increasing total compensation. JEL codes: H23, Q52, Q53, Q54, Q58.
When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation. (JEL H23, Q52, Q53, Q54, Q58)
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