Concepedia

TLDR

Firms risk being fenced in by patent owners of technologies used in their products, yet prior research has not examined how firm characteristics and market fragmentation jointly influence patenting behavior. The study investigates how firms expand patent portfolios to mitigate hold‑up risks, using a citations‑based fragmentation index to analyze 67 U.S. semiconductor firms from 1980 to 1994. Drawing on transaction‑cost theory and IP exchange literature, the authors predict that highly fragmented technology markets and strong legal regimes drive firms—especially those with large tech investments—to patent more aggressively, a hypothesis tested with a citations‑based fragmentation index and regression analysis.

Abstract

How do firms avoid being “fenced in” by owners of patented technologies used, perhaps unknowingly, in the design or manufacture of their products? This paper examines the conditions under which firms expand their own portfolios of patents in response to potential hold-up problems in markets for technology. Combining insights from transactions cost theory with recent scholarship on intellectual property and its exchange, I predict firms will patent more aggressively than otherwise expected when markets for technology are highly fragmented (i.e., ownership rights to external technologies are widely distributed); this effect should be more pronounced for firms with large investments in technology-specific assets and under a strong legal appropriability regime. Although these characteristics of firms and their external environments have been highlighted in the theoretical literature, prior research has not explored the extent to which such factors interact to shape the patenting behavior of firms. To empirically test these hypotheses, I develop a citations-based “fragmentation index” and estimate the determinants of patenting for 67 U.S. semiconductor firms between 1980 and 1994. Accumulating exclusionary rights of their own may enable firms to safeguard their investments in new technologies while foregoing some of the costs and delays associated with ex ante contracting.

References

YearCitations

Page 1