Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study

Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes, Vincent P. Crawford

American Economic Review · 2006 · 567 citations · 34 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The study reports an experiment eliciting subjects’ initial responses to 16 dominance‑solvable two‑person guessing games. The experiment presents the game structure publicly while varying payoff parameters freely, enabling strong separation of behavior predicted by leading decision rules. Most participants understood the games and aimed to maximize payoffs, yet many used simplified models of opponents, producing systematic deviations from equilibrium that are largely captured by a level‑k structural nonequilibrium model.

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules. Subjects' decisions and searches show that most subjects understood the games and sought to maximize payoffs, but many had simplified models of others' decisions that led to systematic deviations from equilibrium. The predictable component of their deviations is well explained by a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on level-k thinking.

References

34