Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya

TLDR

Tracking can help strong students and hurt weak ones, but may benefit all students if teachers can tailor instruction, especially lower‑achieving pupils when teachers are incentivized to teach to the top of the distribution. The study proposes a simple model nesting peer and teacher incentive effects and tests its implications in a randomized tracking experiment in 121 Kenyan primary schools. The authors implemented a randomized tracking experiment across 121 primary schools in Kenya to evaluate the model’s predictions. While the direct effect of high‑achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower‑achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. JEL codes: I21, J45, O15.

Abstract

To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15)