IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · 2015 · 184 citations · 32 references
ComputingComputer SystemsInformation TechnologyAuction TheoryComputer NetworksVirtualizationCombinatorial AuctionsMobile NetworksNetwork VirtualizationResource AllocationResource ProvisioningResource SchedulingCellular Communication NetworksCellular Network ArchitectureCellular NetworksCombinatorial Auction DesignHierarchical Resource ManagementPhysical ResourcesTelecommunications Infrastructure SharingWinner Determination Problem
Virtualization has been seen as one of the main evolution trends in the forthcoming fifth generation (5G) cellular networks which enables the decoupling of infrastructure from the services it provides. In this case, the roles of infrastructure providers (InPs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) can be logically separated and the resources (e.g., subchannels, power, and antennas) of a base station owned by an InP can be transparently shared by multiple MVNOs, while each MVNO virtually owns the entire BS. Naturally, the issue of resource allocation arises. In particular, the InP is required to abstract the physical resources into isolated slices for each MVNO who then allocates the resources within the slice to its subscribed users. In this paper, we aim to address this two-level hierarchical resource allocation problem while satisfying the requirements of efficient resource allocation, strict inter-slice isolation, and the ability of intra-slice customization. To this end, we design a hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism, based on which a truthful and sub-efficient resource allocation framework is provided. Specifically, winner determination problems (WDPs) are formulated for the InP and MVNOs, and computationally tractable algorithms are proposed to solve these WDPs. Also, pricing schemes are designed to ensure incentive compatibility. The designed mechanism can achieve social efficiency in each level even if each party involved acts selfishly. Numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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