Attack Directories, Not Caches: Side Channel Attacks in a Non-Inclusive World

Mengjia Yan, Read Sprabery, Bhargava Gopireddy, Christopher W. Fletcher, Roy H. Campbell, Josep Torrellas

2019 · 191 citations · 41 references

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Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

Cache attacks on shared caches have been a major security issue, but their effectiveness is now questioned as modern systems move away from inclusive cache hierarchies. The authors aim to show that non‑inclusive cache directories can be exploited to launch conflict‑based attacks, presenting the first cross‑core Prime+Probe and high‑bandwidth Evict+Reload attacks. They reverse engineer the sliced non‑inclusive cache directory and use it to bootstrap conflict‑based attacks—including a cross‑core Prime+Probe and a high‑bandwidth Evict+Reload—that require no shared memory or same‑core execution. Both attacks successfully extracted RSA key bits from GnuPG on a modern non‑inclusive Intel Skylake‑X server.

Abstract

Although clouds have strong virtual memory isolation guarantees, cache attacks stemming from shared caches have proved to be a large security problem. However, despite the past effectiveness of cache attacks, their viability has recently been called into question on modern systems, due to trends in cache hierarchy design moving away from inclusive cache hierarchies. In this paper, we reverse engineer the structure of the directory in a sliced, non-inclusive cache hierarchy, and prove that the directory can be used to bootstrap conflict-based cache attacks on the last-level cache. We design the first cross-core Prime+Probe attack on non-inclusive caches. This attack works with minimal assumptions: the adversary does not need to share any virtual memory with the victim, nor run on the same processor core. We also show the first high-bandwidth Evict+Reload attack on the same hardware. We demonstrate both attacks by extracting key bits during RSA operations in GnuPG on a state-of-the-art non-inclusive Intel Skylake-X server.

References

41