Journal of Industrial Economics · 2018 · 32 citations · 18 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAuction TheoryBusiness EthicsContract TheoryAdverse SelectionAsymmetric InformationInformation AsymmetryMoral HazardReputationReputation ManagementAdverse Selection CorrectionMarket ShareMoral Hazard AnalysisNegative FeedbackNegative Feedback MechanismsOnline Reputation SystemsReputation MechanismsSeller Reputation Management
Markets prone to asymmetric information employ reputation mechanisms to address adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper, we use a change in such a reputation mechanism to examine its effect on improving adverse selection and moral hazard. In May, 2008, eBay changed its reputation mechanism to prevent sellers from giving negative feedback to buyers. This change was intended to prevent sellers from retaliating against buyers who gave them negative feedback. We observe an improvement in the overall quality of the marketplace as a result of this change. We attribute 49%–77% of this improvement to reduced adverse selection as low‐quality sellers exit the market or their market share drops, and the rest to a reduction in moral hazard as sellers improve the quality of their service.
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PENNIES FROM EBAY: THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE IN ONLINE AUCTIONS<sup>*</sup>
David Lucking‐Reiley, Doug Bryan, Naghi Prasad et al. · Journal of Industrial Economics · 2007 · 572 citations · Full text
Economic Insights from Internet Auctions
Patrick Bajari · Journal of Economic Literature · 2004 · 532 citations