Replies to Gaus, Van Schoelandt and Cooper: Prudence, Morality and the Social Contract

Abstract

In Minimal Morality (2018), I develop a multilevel social contract theory that combines Humean, Hobbesian and Kantian moral features to accommodate deep moral pluralism. I argue that, for the conditions described, the theory is most promising for ensuring mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral pluralism, is unattainable. In this article, following some initial remarks that frame my responses, I reply to comments by Jerry Gaus, Chad Van Schoelandt and Dominick Cooper. I am most grateful for the commentators’ incisive and constructive comments that allow me to clarify some of the main features of the theory, defend its core projects and expand discussion of some of its details in order to show that the theory can address the challenges raised. I have organized my responses according to the three core projects of the book that aim to (i) revive orthodox rational choice contractarianism as a viable approach to the social contract, (ii) integrate this purely instrumental approach to morality into a comprehensive social contract theory and (iii) show the applicability of the theory to the real world.