The Journal of Philosophy · 2018 · 24 citations · 17 references
It is widely thought in philosophy and elsewhere that parsimony is a theoretical virtue in that if T1 is more parsimonious than T2, then T1 is preferable to T2, other things being equal. This thesis admits of many distinct precisifications. I focus on a relatively weak precisification on which preferability is a matter of probability, and argue that it is false. This is problematic for various alternative precisifications, and even for Inference to the Best Explanation as standardly understood.
17
<i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</i>
Thomas Kühn, Richard Schlegel · Physics Today · 1963 · 35.5K citations
Humanities, History, Physics +17
Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind.
Harry C. Triandis, Geert Hofstede · Administrative Science Quarterly · 1993 · 17.9K citations · Full text