Emergent politics and constitutional drift: the fragility of procedural liberalism

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to integrate classical elite theory into theories of constitutional bargains. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative methods/surveys/case studies. Findings Open-ended constitutional entrepreneurship cannot be forestalled. Constitutional entrepreneurs will almost always be social elites. Research limitations/implications The research yields a toolkit for analysing constitutional bargains. It needs to be used in historical settings to acquire greater empirical content. Need to be applied to concrete historical cases to do economic history. Right now it is still only institutionally contingent theory. Practical implications Formal constitutions do not, and cannot, bind. Informal constitutions can, but they are continually evolving due to elite pressure group behaviors. Social implications Liberalism needs another method to institutionalize itself! Originality/value Open-ended nature of constitutional bargaining overlooked in orthodox institutional entrepreneurship/constitutional economics literature.