2016 · 41 citations · 14 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityHardware SecuritySecurity ArchitectureHardware TrojansSide-channel AttacksHardware Trojan InsertionHardware Trojan ResistanceLogic Gate ImplementationLogic Gate NetworksMalicious Circuit InsertionOverhead ReductionSide-channel CountermeasuresThreshold Voltage
Semiconductor supply chain is increasingly getting exposed to variety of security attacks such as Trojan insertion, cloning, counterfeiting, reverse engineering (RE), piracy of Intellectual Property (IP) or Integrated Circuit (IC) and side-channel analysis due to involvement of untrusted parties. In this paper, we propose threshold voltage-defined switches that will camouflage the logic gate both logically and physically to resist RE and IP piracy. The proposed gate can function as NAND, AND, NOR, OR, XOR, and XNOR robustly using threshold defined switches. We also propose a flavor of camouflaged gate that represents reduced functionality (NAND, NOR and NOT) at much lower overhead. The camouflaged design operates at nominal voltage and obeys conventional reliability limits. A small fraction of gates can be camouflaged to increase the RE effort extremely high. Simulation results indicate 46-53% area, 59-68% delay and 52-76% power overhead when 5-15% gates are identified and camouflaged using the proposed gate. A significant higher RE effort is achieved when the proposed gate is employed in the netlist using controllability, observability and hamming distance sensitivity based gate selection metrics.
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Security analysis of logic obfuscation
Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Youngok Pino, Ozgur Sinanoglu et al. · 2012 · 489 citations
Security analysis of integrated circuit camouflaging
Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Michael Sam, Ozgur Sinanoglu et al. · 2013 · 379 citations