The “Necessary Evil” Defense of Manipulative Advertising

Abstract

Near the end of an article in which he argues that there is no definitive basis for condemning manipulative advertising, Michael Phillips offers a defense of it.1 He asks us to imagine a world in which the critics of manipulative advertising succeed in having it eliminated or radically curtailed. Since the critics assume that advertising fuels the consumer economy, they must concede that its elimination or curtailment will result in a significant reduction in consumerist behavior. Phillips then suggests that the economic consequences of this reduction might be disastrous. Demand for goods would fall, and this could lead to lower economic output, business failures, and higher unemployment. Phillips warns that a more authoritarian government might be necessary in order to address the resulting social instability. In short, he argues that the transition to a postconsumer society might be so rough that manipulative advertising's ultimate justification may be its status as a necessary evil.2 Whether Phillips' responses to other criticisms of manipulative advertising are convincing are matters that I leave for others to discuss. My focus is on the narrow question of whether such advertising can be defended as a necessary evil in the way that Phillips suggests. It is important to formulate carefully the issue under discussion. There is, it