Journal of Political Economy · 2015 · 229 citations · 57 references
ManagementOrganization StudiesOrganizational BehaviorGoal SettingOrganizational DevelopmentSelfSelf-managementSelf-regulationLoss Of Self-controlSelf-regulated BehaviorSelf-regulation Of Long-term Goals
Self-control problems change the logic of agency theory by partly aligning the interests of the firm and worker: both now value contracts that elicit future effort. Findings from a year-long field experiment with full-time data entry workers support this idea. First, workers increase output by voluntarily choosing dominated contracts (which penalize low output but give no additional rewards for high output). Second, effort increases closer to (randomly assigned) paydays. Third, the contract and payday effects are strongly correlated within workers, and this correlation grows with experience. We suggest that workplace features such as high-powered incentives or effort monitoring may provide self-control benefits.
57
Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
David Laibson · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1997 · 6.2K citations · Full text
TIME, WORK-DISCIPLINE, AND INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
Past & Present · 1967 · 3.7K citations
Ted O’Donoghue, Matthew Rabin · American Economic Review · 1999 · 3.2K citations