Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) · 2011 · 15 citations · 42 references
ManagementBusiness EconomicsCorporate GovernanceCorporate FinanceCorporate StrategyExecutive CompensationCorporate Governance MechanismsDeferred CompensationEquity CompensationEquity-based CompensationOwnership StructureStock OptionsCeo Equity CompensationCeo Stock OptionsCeo TurnoverEquity-based IncentivesExecutive Compensation DecisionsFirms' Investment Decisions Under Flotation CostsShareholder TenureStock Options Compensation
This paper examines the impact of the newly appointed CEOs on firms future investment decisions and whether the relation is affected by the equity-based compensation, corporate governance provisions and other CEO characteristics. Using CEO turnover data from 1992-2004, the results show that new CEOs with high options-based compensation, following forced turnover and with shorter organization tenure, are associated with high R&D and advertisement investments. These results are consistent with the managerial incentive effect and the dismissal effect.
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The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior
Brian J. Bushee · SSRN Electronic Journal · 1998 · 3.2K citations · Full text
Business, Finance, Agency Theory +11