Financial Analysts Journal · 1998 · 138 citations · 74 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceCorporate StrategyConflict ManagementCorporate Governance DisputesCorporate Governance MechanismsOwnership StructureShareholder ProtectionShareholder-manager ConflictsAgency Conflicts Between ShareholdersCorporate Control MechanismsDecision-making AuthorityManagement ConflictMechanisms
The separation of ownership and control in a modern corporation often requires the delegation of significant decision-making authority to professional managers, which introduces the possibility that managers will have incentives to make decisions that benefit them at the expense of stockholders. We discuss the theory and empirical evidence on stockholder–manager conflicts, provide an overview of the problems that can arise in U.S. corporations, summarize recent empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the various mechanisms that can control these problems, and alert investors to global variations in problems and controls.
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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