Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions

TLDR

States cooperate to impose economic sanctions when a leading state organizes the effort and other states may free‑ride. Cooperation is achieved by the leading state using issue‑linkage tactics—threats or side payments—together with high‑cost sanctions and institutional mechanisms that raise audience costs for reneging. The study finds that credible issue‑linkages and costly sanctions are associated with higher levels of international cooperation, as shown by 99 post‑1945 sanction cases.

Abstract

The conditions under which states will cooperate to impose economic sanctions are of both theoretical and practical interest. Generally, when sanctions are used, one state takes the lead in organizing and imposing them. Other states have incentives to free ride on the “leading sender's” efforts. To gain cooperation, the leading sender uses tactical issue-linkage in the form of either threats or side payments. The success of cooperation depends on the credibility of these issue-linkages. The use of high-cost sanctions and international institutions raises the potential for high audience costs if the leading sender reneges. These policies thus indicate credible commitments. Data on ninety-nine cases of post-1945 economic sanctions show that costly measures coincide with high levels of international cooperation.