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Optional forward contracts for electric power markets
99
Citations
8
References
1994
Year
EngineeringEnergy MarketsMarket EquilibriumOptional Forward ContractsCallable Forward ContractsMarket DesignPricingSupply-side AnaloguesPricing PolicyPower MarketEconomic AnalysisMechanism DesignAntitrust EnforcementElectrical EngineeringEconomicsDynamic PricingMarket ParticipantsMarket MechanismPower TradingOptimal ContractingMarketingFinanceElectricity MarketSmart GridEnergy ManagementEnergy PolicyBusinessElectricity Markets
This paper extends the idea of callable forward contracts, which are potentially useful as demand-side (interruptible-load) contracts, to their supply-side analogues. Together, these contracts allow market participants to take advantage of flexibility in generation or consumption to obtain a monetary benefit, while simultaneously removing the risk of market price fluctuations. This paper also considers the effects of strategic behavior on the part of market participants in their contract sales/purchase decisions.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">></ETX>
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