American Political Science Review · 1998 · 500 citations · 44 references
Social SciencesInternational RelationsPolitical ScienceDemocratizationElectoral PoliticsNegotiationCrisis BargainingCrisis NegotiationDomestic PoliticsNegotiation TheoryParty CompetitionPolitical CompetitionBargaining Model Of WarConflict BargainingCrisis Bargaining TheoryCrisis Escalation DynamicsIncomplete Information EquilibriumOpposition PartiesPolitical Competition ModelsRetrospective Government Evaluation
In a state with a government and an opposition party, both openly signal support for force to alter the status quo. The study investigates how domestic political competition influences the escalation of international crises. The model couples crisis bargaining with a two‑party electoral choice, letting the rival state update beliefs and respond to both parties’ signals while parties’ payoffs hinge on retrospective electoral evaluation. Including a strategic opposition party lowers the ex‑ante probability of war by revealing the state's preferences, offering a way for democratic states to overcome informational asymmetries.
This article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises. It combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two-party electoral choice. One state has two strategic actors—a government and an opposition party—both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo. The rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals. The parties' payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate. The model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state's preferences. This finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict, since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries, which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation.
44
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Edward C. Banfield, Anthony J. Downs · Midwest Journal of Political Science · 1958 · 18.9K citations
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.
John Ericson, Robert A. Dahl · American Quarterly · 1972 · 7.3K citations
Rationalist explanations for war
James D. Fearon · International Organization · 1995 · 4K citations