Incomplete Information Equilibrium

Incomplete Information Equilibrium is a solution concept in game theory that extends the Nash Equilibrium to strategic interactions where players have private information about their own payoffs or types, characterizing a profile of strategies in which each player’s strategy maximizes expected utility given their beliefs about others’ types and strategies, and these beliefs are consistent with the common prior and observed actions.

1.1K

Publications

96.9K

Citations

1.6K

Authors

731

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

160

Variants

Bayesian Nash EquilibriumBne

Authors

1.6K

  1. DB
    Dirk Bergemann

    Yale University, United States

    13 publications · 1.1K citations

    13

    h-index

  2. DF
    Drew Fudenberg

    Harvard University, United States

    11 publications · 3.7K citations

    10

    h-index

  3. SM
    Stephen Morris

    University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

    10 publications · 981 citations

    10

    h-index

  4. FC
    Frank C. Zagare

    University at Buffalo, State University of New York, United States

    8 publications · 273 citations

    8

    h-index

  5. TR
    Thomas R. Palfrey

    California Institute of Technology, United States

    7 publications · 1.3K citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 1.6K

Venues

  1. Econometrica

    48 publications · 17.5K citations

    41

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 43 publications · 4.2K citations

    29

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 82 publications · 2.3K citations

    25

    h-index

  4. The Review of Economic Studies

    27 publications · 3.4K citations

    22

    h-index

  5. American Economic Review

    21 publications · 8.1K citations

    20

    h-index

1–5