Incomplete Information Equilibrium
Incomplete Information Equilibrium is a solution concept in game theory that extends the Nash Equilibrium to strategic interactions where players have private information about their own payoffs or types, characterizing a profile of strategies in which each player’s strategy maximizes expected utility given their beliefs about others’ types and strategies, and these beliefs are consistent with the common prior and observed actions.
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2017–2026
160
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Bayesian Nash EquilibriumBne
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton, Axel Ockenfels · American Economic Review · 2000 · 5.5K citations
H. Peyton Young · Econometrica · 1993 · 2.4K citations
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
Hans Carlsson, Eric van Damme · Econometrica · 1993 · 1.6K citations
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University at Buffalo, State University of New York, United States
8 publications · 273 citations
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New York University
New York, United States
20 h-index
31 publications
2.5K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
20 h-index
30 publications
7.5K citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
19 h-index
26 publications
3.4K citations
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, United States
17 h-index
20 publications
4.3K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
17 h-index
26 publications
2.7K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
16 h-index
19 publications
1.4K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
16 h-index
32 publications
4.5K citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
15 h-index
24 publications
4.5K citations
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48 publications · 17.5K citations
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JET · 43 publications · 4.2K citations
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Repository · 82 publications · 2.3K citations
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