British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology · 1983 · 106 citations · 0 references
BusinessDecision SciencesPsychologyDecision MakingDecision TheoryUncertainty QuantificationBayesian Decision TheoryDecision Under AmbiguityDecision Under UncertaintyDecision-making Under UncertaintyProspect TheoryUncertainty EstimationDecision Analysis Under AmbiguityDecision Analysis Under UncertaintyDecision Theory Under UncertaintyEpistemic Decision TheoryEpistemic ReliabilityProbabilistic ReasoningUncertainty AssessmentUncertainty In Decision Making
This paper presents a decision theory which allows subjects to account for the uncertainties of their probability estimates. This is accomplished by modelling beliefs about states of nature by means of a class of probability measures. In order to represent uncertainties of those beliefs a measure of epistemic reliability is introduced. The suggested decision theory is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence on ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making. The theory is also compared to Tversky & Kahneman's prospect theory.