International Economic Review · 2000 · 158 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsContract TheoryGame TheoryMicroeconomicsCoordination GamesMarriageMatching TheoryMate ChoiceMating StrategiesTwo-sided MarketsEquilibrium In Search ModelsMarriage Market EconomicsMarriage MarketsMarriage ProblemMatching GamesMatching MarketsPartner Matching
Utility in the model equals the index of an agent’s mate. The article analyzes the provision of matching services in a two‑sided search model. Agents are drawn from two heterogeneous populations on [0,1], form subintervals in equilibrium, and are matched only within their class, with marriage brokers using a centralized procedure. When the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only higher‑quality agents participate in the centralized procedure, whereas a commission on matching surplus attracts only lower‑quality agents.
This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two‐sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary.