The RAND Journal of Economics · 2013 · 53 citations · 42 references
LawBusiness EconomicsIncentive SystemsIntellectual PropertyPatent LawPatent AnalysisPatent ExaminationPatent Office PracticeAdverse Selection PricingMoral Hazard AnalysisPatent Examination QualityPatent Quality ControlPatent Quality Review
Patent examination is a problem of moral hazard followed by adverse selection: examiners must have incentives to exert effort, but also to truthfully reveal the evidence they find. I develop a theoretical model to study the design of incentives for examiners. The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as the variation in compensation schemes and patent quality across patent offices. It also has implications for the retention of examiners and for administrative patent review.
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Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it
Choice Reviews Online · 1990 · 3.9K citations
R&D, Patents, and Productivity
Irwin Feller, Zvi Griliches · Technology and Culture · 1987 · 1.2K citations
Management, Innovation Management, Technology Management +10