Publication | Open Access
Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context‐Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects
269
Citations
86
References
2014
Year
Language GroundingGrounded FeaturesNeurolinguisticsSemantic ProcessingSentence SemanticsPsycholinguisticsCognitionSemanticsAttentionLanguage ProcessingSocial SciencesCognitive LinguisticsCognitive ConstructionLanguage StudiesCognitive NeuroscienceCognitive ScienceSemantic InterpretationEmbodied CognitionGrounded Congruency EffectsGrounded InformationSpatial MeaningSpatial CognitionLinguistics
Grounded cognition predicts that sensory‑motor features of words trigger simulations that interact with spatial responses to produce congruency effects, yet evidence shows these effects are not always present, suggesting that grounded features may not be automatically activated across contexts and that concepts may lack fixed cores. The study reviews evidence that words do not possess fixed conceptual cores and that even the most salient features are not automatically activated. Three experiments demonstrate that grounded congruency effects depend on contextual salience, with central grounded features becoming active only when the current context highlights them. The results indicate that even when grounded features are central to a word’s meaning, their activation is contingent on specific task conditions.
According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory-motor features activate sensory-motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.
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