Do U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of California

Abstract

Abstract This review tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit‐maximizing cartels. It analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry and the authority granted to a board of producers by the almond marketing order would seem to be conducive to profit‐maximizing cartel behavior. Nevertheless, the authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California is significantly less than would be expected from a profit‐maximizing cartel. [EconLit citations: L120, L430]. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 20: 1–15, 2004.