Deciding to Bribe: a Cross-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Influences on Bribery Activity

TLDR

Local firms frequently engage in culturally defined corruption, notably bribing public officials. The study applies multilevel and anomie theory to explain why bribery varies across countries and how firm‑level pressures promote bribery as a strategy. Hierarchical linear modeling of data from nearly 4,000 firms worldwide tests cross‑level predictions about bribery. Country‑level cultural and institutional drivers of firm bribery are supported, and firm‑level pressures are shown to encourage bribery as a strategy.

Abstract

Local firms in their home countries often engage in behavior that constitutes corruption, at least through some cultural lenses. One such practice is bribery of public officials. This study uses multilevel theory to address the question of why bribery activity of this type differs among countries. We analyze responses from nearly 4,000 firms worldwide using hierarchical linear modeling to investigate cross-level predictions about bribery. Drawing from anomie theory, we find support for country-level cultural and institutional drivers of firm-level bribery. We extend anomie theory by showing how firm-level pressures can encourage the supplying of bribes as a firm strategy.