Journal of Political Economy · 1989 · 368 citations · 8 references
Social SciencesEconomicsGame TheoryMarkov Decision ProcessesMicroeconomicsGeneral EquilibriumGeneral Equilibrium TheoryHidden InformationInformation EconomicsNash EquilibriumReinforcement LearningHidden-state ModelsLearning Under Asymmetric InformationLearning With Imperfect InformationMechanism Design Under Private InformationRational Expectations Equilibrium ExistenceState Variables
We study the convergence of recursive least-squares learning schemes in economic environments in which there is private information. The presence of private information leads to the presence of hidden state variables from the viewpoint of particular agents. By applying theorems of Ljung, we extend some of our earlier results to characterize conditions under which a system governed by least-squares learning will eventually converge to a rational expectations equilibrium. We apply insights from the learning results to formulate and compute the equilibrium of a version of Townsend's model.
8
Analysis of recursive stochastic algorithms
Lennart Ljung · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · 1977 · 1.5K citations
An Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle
Robert E. Lucas · Journal of Political Economy · 1975 · 1K citations · Full text
Forecasting the Forecasts of Others
Robert M. Townsend · Journal of Political Economy · 1983 · 479 citations