Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting

TLDR

Evidence of strategic voter behavior shows a lack of a canonical rational choice model for costly voting, yet the literature is converging on group‑based turnout models that involve coordination or ethical obligation. The study seeks to trace the evolution of group‑based voting models by reviewing decision‑theoretic work on the paradox of not voting. The authors then analyze game‑theoretic and group‑based voting models. The conclusion points out several problems that group‑based voting models must address.

Abstract

Given the extensive evidence of apparently strategic voter behavior, it is unsettling that there is not a canonical rational choice model of voting in elections with costs to vote. But while a canonical model does not yet exist, the literature appears to be converging toward a “group-based” model of turnout, in which group members participate in elections either because they are directly coordinated and rewarded by leaders as in “mobilization” models or because they believe themselves to be ethically obliged to act in a manner that is consistent with the group's interest as in “ethical agent” models. To appreciate the development of group-based models, it will be useful to begin with a discussion of the decision-theoretic literature on voting, with a focus on the paradox of not voting. Then we will move to the game-theoretic and group-based models of voting. A conclusion highlights some of the problems that group-based models of voting must address.