The recalcitrance of overconfidence and its contribution to decision aid neglect

Abstract

Abstract Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people's overconfidence in the quality of their intuitive judgment strategies contributes to their reluctance to use helpful actuarial judgment aids. Participants engaged in a judgment task that required them to use five cues to decide whether a prospective juror favored physician‐assisted suicide. Participants had the opportunity to examine the judgments of a statistical equation that correctly classified 77% of the prospective jurors. In all experiments, participants infrequently examined the equation, performed worse than the equation, and were highly overconfident. In Experiments 1 and 2, outcome feedback and calibration feedback failed to reduce overconfidence. In Experiment 3, enhanced calibration feedback reduced overconfidence and increased reliance on the equation, thus leading to improved judgment performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.