Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma Model

Abstract

Realist political theory finds that states are positional in character. Thus, states prefer that relative achievements of jointly produced gains not advantage partners, and their concerns about relative gains may constrain their willingness to cooperate. Conventional presentations of the game of Prisoner's Dilemma do not depict Realism's specification of the relative gains element of the structure of state preferences or Realism's analysis of the capacity of state concerns about relative gains to impede cooperation. However, by distinguishing between game payoffs and state utility, an Amended Prisoner's Dilemma model can depict both the relative-gains element of state preferences and the relative-gains problem for cooperation. This Amended Prisoner's Dilemma facilitates analysis of an important systemic constraint on international cooperation identified by Realist political theory, contributes to our understanding of international institutions, and draws our attention to a number of potentially interesting research problems concerning international collaboration.