Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · 2009 · 215 citations · 50 references
BusinessDecision SciencesPsychologyDecision AnalysisDecision TheoryMemoryBehavioral Decision-makingChoice Under UncertaintyDecision Making Under RiskDecision Under UncertaintyDecision-making Under UncertaintyUtility TheoryChoice Over Time Under UncertaintyExperience Of UncertaintyExperience-based Decision MakingMemory Constraints In ChoicePreference Under UncertaintyUncertainty Aversion
Abstract A striking finding has emerged recently in the literature: When decision makers are faced with essentially the same choice, their preferences differ as a function of whether options are described or are “experienced” via observation and feedback. For example, when presented the described choice: (A) A 90% chance of $0 and a 10% chance of $10 or (B) $1 for sure, people tend to prefer (A). But when those same two options are experienced through observation of “draws” from two payoff distributions that match the described options, the modal preference reverses. Why? This is just one question that the papers in this special issue address. In addition, they address the rich repertoire of issues that arise when one considers experience‐based choices. The decisions‐from‐experience paradigm—with its focus on the acquisition and integration of information prior to choice, as well the choice itself—taps many of the fundamentals of psychology (learning, memory, encoding, knowledge representation, modelling) thus inspiring novel and fruitful avenues for research. This paper reviews recent research on experience‐based choice, and highlights the contribution of the papers in the special issue. The paper introduces a framework that places different types of decisions along a continuum of uncertainty about what one is choosing between, which emphasizes the rich and varied role of “experience” in decision making. It ends by identifying important unsolved questions that are ripe for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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